There are many different definitions out there as to what it means to be a 'person' -- the humanistic definition (such as one like the contemporary philosophy Robert Spaemann's here) in which "persons have their their nature such that they are not merely their properties and attributes," and a more Lockean definition based in pcyhological continuity. While the humanistic definition tends to advocate what seems like speciesism, there has been much discussion of late regarding the possibility of deeming certain animal species as persons -- apes, elephants, porpoises (think about the ramifications of such a classification for already majorly-scrutinized Sea World!) and many people content that we do and should give some kind of recognition to other living beings which affords them a level of protected dignity.
So here's a thought-experiment regarding those species and their possible 'personhood' -- and not just the higher-level beings like the ones listed above, but more closely linked to us, our pet-species. Like human persons, animals are single unique wholes, and respond to stimuli in a way which invokes sensations like pain (which, we can empathize with, too). There is an 'inwardness' which non-human beings have in common with human beings -- what often lacks though is recognition of sensations such as pain is the animal's failure to achieve mutual understanding (or empathy) about that pain with another being; animals lack conceptual language, the ability to translate that pain and empathy into words in order to share the abstract concepts, which the human person does have at his or her disposal. This is the ability which many in the humanist-camp see as part of the experience of what it is to be a person inherently. Thus, the lack in the animal is that which makes it not a person.
Of course, you can make the argument that many humans lack this language as well -- newborn babies lack language and the ability to understand or conceptualize empathy, as do those who may have very severe mental disabilities, or those in comas -- which would disqualify them from personal status with this definition as well, in the same way that the psychological continuity argument of the Lockean-camp would also suggest. However, the difference lies in the concept of potentiality. Language is a potential the entire species has, by genetic-nature as was as cultural-nature, even if it is something individuals may not have, due to some mutation or nurtured-deficit because of lack of development. In fact, it is through the prior recognition of the parent, who speaks to the child as a person, that the child develops language and eventually comes to recognize himself or herself as a person. Like Hegel contends in his Phenomenology of Spirit, it is through the interaction of two subjective minds that the subjective self comes to recognize himself as the subjective self, or in this case, as a person. Without that subjective interaction, what may occur is simply a recognition of the self as a distinct thing from another object, but only when confronted with another person do we recognize that we are persons as well.
It seems, quite often, that we at least recognize many other qualities in non-human beings which are like our own. Naming our pets, recognizing in them qualities such as pain and hunger, and even the more advanced skills of language recognition in the form of trained commands, seems to suggest our bestowal upon the animal at least some element of personality which makes the being not strictly a 'something.' What might be occurring is not so much the true personhood of the animal, but rather a projection of our own personhood in a way that leads to a level of empathy with the living (non-human, non-person) being. For example, because I have already recognized in myself my own personhood, when I see qualities which are exhibited like personality in my pet, I choose to treat her as a person, and I empathetically bestow upon her some of the freedoms which persons are afforded -- such as a particular name, certain humane treatment, etc. However, no matter how much like a person I treat her, she will never come to recognize herself as such. Ultimately, the personhood of which we recognize is not the animal's, but our own.
No matter how much we talk to the animal as a person, in the same way we talk to our newborn children who have not yet (that's the key -- the property is innately there) developed linguistic skills, they simply will not learn to use language in the same way as to recognize in themselves our personhood or their own, at least, not yet. It may be that evolution may allow for such a development of capabilities, in which case the entire species -- like porpoises -- deserve the recognition of being persons. But, it would have to then lie within the norm of the entire species, and not some special singular case. Unfortunately, we have yet to find many instances of species with this capacity. And yet, it may be that we only recognize intelligences which manifest in the same way as our own, which leaves still the possibilities that our own egocentric understanding of person may simply not be enough.
[This was adapted from a paper I wrote on the subject for a Personalism class -- in fact, it was a response to another students' paper on the subject (our responses were three pages instead of one)]
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